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AN EXAMINATION OF ASSOCIATIONS AMONG COMPONENTS OF MINDFULNESS
AND WOMEN’S ATTENTION BIAS TO SAD FACES

by

CHERYL L. GARN, MS

Under the Direction of Erin B. Tone, PhD and Robert D. Latzman, PhD

ABSTRACT
Mindfulness, a set of techniques for engaging with stimuli in the present‐moment environment,
has recently received considerable attention in the literature. Mindfulness is drawn from Eastern, Bud‐
dhist traditions and has been integrated into contemporary psychology, in part, as a technique for im‐
proving the ability to respond skillfully to emotionally distressing stimuli and processes (Bishop, et al.,
2004). However, the boundaries of the mindfulness construct have yet to be solidly established; a vari‐
ety of definitions exist and are used inconsistently in the literature. Clarifying how engaging attentional
control processes in response to emotionally‐charged stimuli, such as sad faces, relates to precisely‐ar‐
ticulated models of mindfulness could constitute a useful first step toward better understanding the
construct of mindfulness. One widely‐referenced, viable model of mindfulness, developed by Bishop and

v
colleagues (2004) suggests that mindfulness is composed of two components: attention and acceptance.
It is unclear whether and how these proposed components of mindfulness relate to individual variations
in behavior patterns on measures of attention bias for sad stimuli.
The current study, therefore, aims to examine associations among two components of mindful‐
ness (Bishop, et al., 2004) and performance on a widely‐used measure that elicits attention bias for
emotional cues. It was hypothesized that scores on self‐reported measures of attention and acceptance
components of mindfulness would show negative and moderate associations with attention bias for sad
faces and positive and moderate associations with attention bias for happy faces, indexed both by bias
scores based on reaction times and patterns of visual gaze toward sad and happy faces. One hundred
twenty‐three college students were asked to complete demographic measures, the Philadelphia Mind‐
fulness Scale (PHLMS), and the dot‐probe attention bias paradigm (which yielded both behavioral and
eye movement measures). Complete behavioral attention bias data were acquired for 104 participants
and complete eye tracking data were acquired for 88 participants. Results suggest no significant rela‐
tionships of either component of mindfulness with either measure of attention bias to emotional stim‐
uli. The discussion explores factors that may have contributed to the outcome and ideas for future re‐
search that might further clarify mindfulness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Construct of Mindfulness
Mindfulness, a set of techniques for engaging with stimuli in the present‐moment environment

(Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005), has recently received considerable
attention in the literature. Historically, mindfulness‐based psychological interventions have drawn from
Eastern, Buddhist traditions, which developed mindfulness meditation with the aim of fostering insight
into internal stimuli, as a way to lead to the cessation of personal suffering, even in the context of objec‐
tively painful experiences (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Bishop et al., 2004; Grossman, 2011;
Kabat‐Zinn, 2003; Kumar, 2002; Silananda, 1990; Thera, 1962). From this traditional perspective, mind‐
fulness integrated an attitude of acceptance or non‐judgment with either an attentive awareness of eve‐
rything in one’s environment or sustained attention toward one stimulus (Anderson, Lau, Segal, &
Bishop, 2007; Goleman, 1977; Gunaratana, 1992; Hart, 1987; Langer, 1989).
Jon Kabat‐Zinn formally integrated the concept of mindfulness into Western mental and physical
health treatment in the 1980s (Kabat‐Zinn, 1982). Most subsequent conceptualizations of mindfulness
within the psychology literature have been based on Kabat‐Zinn’s definition of the term, which suggests
that mindfulness is “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present
moment, and non‐judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (2003, p. 145).
Kabat‐Zinn’s interpretation of the concept “mindfulness” has been adopted in contemporary psychol‐
ogy, in part, as a technique for improving the ability to respond skillfully to emotionally distressing stim‐
uli and processes (Bishop, et al., 2004).
When examining relationships among mindfulness and other variables, researchers do not al‐
ways adhere strictly to Kabat‐Zinn’s definition. Indeed, they disagree considerably about the structure
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and boundaries of the mindfulness construct. This lack of a uniformly‐accepted definition makes it diffi‐
cult to interpret findings from research on relationships between mindfulness and putative correlates,
such as attentional patterns for emotional stimuli (Bergomi Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013; Bishop, 2002).
There is some agreement that mindfulness may comprise multiple components. However, con‐
sensus is lacking regarding these components. Definitions include different combinations of intention (or
purpose; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006; Shapiro & Schwartz, 2000), non‐reactivity (Baer, et
al., 2008), creativity (Langer, 1989), describing (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer et al., 2008), emotion
regulation (Tang, Hölzel, & Posner, 2015), observing (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer, Smith, Hopkins,
Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer et al., 2008), acting with awareness (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer,
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer et al., 2008), acceptance or non‐judgment (Baer,
Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer, et al., 2008; Bishop, et al., 2004; Langer, 1989; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, &
Freedman, 2006; Tang, Hölzel, & Posner, 2015), and attention (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer, Smith,
Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer et al., 2008; Bishop, et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Langer, 1989; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006; Tang, Hölzel, & Posner, 2015).
Several concerns have been raised about some of these proposed components of mindfulness.
For example, some putative components (e.g., observe and describe, describe and act with awareness,
and non‐judging and non‐reactivity; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Coffey, Hartman, and Fredrickson, 2010)
moderately correlate with each other, which may suggest that they are not wholly distinct (Baer, Smith,
& Allen, 2004; Baer, et al., 2008; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). Further, it is
not clear whether some proposed components (such as non‐reactivity, creativity, and emotion regula‐
tion) might instead be outcomes or consequences of mindfulness rather than aspects of mindfulness it‐
self (Bishop, et al., 2004; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010).
In contrast, two other putative components, attention and acceptance, emerge with notable
consistency across definitions (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer et al., 2008; Bishop, et al., 2004; Brown
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& Ryan, 2003; Langer, 1989; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). These two components are
deeply rooted in Buddhist tradition (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Gunaratana, 1992; Hanh,
1987) and have met with fewer questions, in part because they appear to be distinct from each other
(Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Coffey, Hartmann, & Fredrickson, 2010).
Mindful attention is generally thought to comprise awareness and attentional control, although
there is not always consistency in how these components are defined. In the attention literature,
awareness is considered to be a stimulus‐driven or bottom‐up attentional process and attentional con‐
trol is a separate top‐down set of attentional processes that includes sustained attention, inhibition, and
attention switching (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Jha, et al., 2007; Posner & Peterson, 1990;
Washburn, Latzman, Schultz, & Bramlett, 2015). In the mindfulness literature, however, awareness is
generally defined as “the background ‘radar’ of consciousness, continually monitoring the inner and
outer environment” (Brown & Ryan, 2003, p. 822). To focus awareness, an individual must engage at‐
tentional control processes to bring salient aspects of the inner and outer environments into the fore‐
ground (Bishop, et al., 2004). Attentional control skills are also necessary skill for maintaining awareness
of relevant stimuli over time (sustained attention), preventing elaborative processes that are irrelevant
to stimuli in the present environment (inhibition), and facilitating shifts in focus as new details become
salient (attention switching; Bishop et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Gunaratana, 1992; Kabat‐Zinn,
2003). Therefore, in mindfulness top‐down and bottom‐up attentional processes may work in concert
to cause an intentional, monitored awareness of internal and external stimuli in the present‐moment
environment.
Mindful acceptance is also frequently identified in theoretical (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer,
et al., 2008; Bishop, et al., 2004; Langer, 1989; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006) and empirical
(Cardaciotto, et al., 2008; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010) accounts as a necessary component in
mindfulness. Mindful acceptance has been defined as an orientation of one’s attention such that one is
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curious about, open to, and nonjudgmental of stimuli in the environment (Bishop et al., 2004; Langer,
1989; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002).
This definition of mindfulness as composed of two distinct and necessary components—atten‐
tion and acceptance (Bishop et al., 2004; Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Coffey, Hartman, and Fredrickson,
2010; Kabat‐Zinn, 2003)—allows for several possible patterns of association between mindfulness and
patterns of attention to emotional stimuli. First, mindfulness may facilitate effective and intentional de‐
ployment of attention processes in response to potentially emotionally‐dysregulating cues (i.e., emo‐
tional stimuli that may trigger emotion dysregulation; Bishop et al., 2004) that enter awareness. Sec‐
ond, mindfulness may facilitate a receptive and accepting, rather than mood‐congruent (e.g., sadness,
grief, or rejection; Beck, 1967; Teasdale, 1988), pattern of emotional response to such cues (Bishop et
al., 2004). It is also possible that one component is more strongly correlated with attention patterns for
emotional stimuli than is the other or that both are equally and independently correlated with attention
patterns to emotional stimuli.
However, few researchers have examined hypothetical relationships among these two proposed
components of mindfulness and attention patterns to emotional stimuli. In order to do so, it is neces‐
sary to identify attention patterns that are amenable to measurement and that have been linked to
emotional dysregulation. The present study is focused on attention bias for sad cues, or a behavioral
tendency to preferentially attend to a sad stimulus set (Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), as a first step
toward understanding relationships among components of mindfulness and patterns of attention for
emotional stimuli. The next section discusses the literature on attention biases.
1.2

Attention Bias to Sad Faces
Numerous cognitive and behavioral patterns have been suggested as possible targets in investiga‐

tions of cognitive, particularly attentional, disruptions that occur in the context of emotional dysregula‐
tion (e.g., memory dysfunction [Fossati, Coyette, Ergis, & Allilaire, 2002; Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009;
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Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000], rumination [Nolen‐Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen‐Hoeksema,
Wisco, & Lynbomirsky, 2008; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen‐Hoeksema, 2009], and visual attention biases
[Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Joormann, 2009; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002;
Wells & Beevers, 2010]). One in particular—attention bias toward emotional stimuli, which has been
well‐documented as a correlate and predictor of anxious (Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach, & Hermann, 2016;
Eldar, Ricon, & Bar‐Haim, 2008; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Taylor, Cross, & Amir, 2016) and depressive
symptoms (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Wells &
Beevers, 2010)—appears to be especially well suited for use in research on mindfulness, conceptualized
as comprising attention and acceptance.
In the present study, I focus on a specific type of attention bias—bias to attend preferentially to
sad cues—that has been associated with increased emotional distress responses and depressive symp‐
toms (Baert et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; MacLeod et al., 2002; Wells & Beevers, 2010). I selected
this focus for several reasons. First, attention biases are measured behaviorally rather than via self‐re‐
port, which is consistent with recommendations for assessing components of mindfulness (Bishop,
2002). Second, measures of attention bias to emotional stimuli yield indices that researchers have inter‐
preted as signaling regulated (or dysregulated) implementation of sustained attention and inhibition for
emotional stimuli that enter awareness (Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joor‐
mann, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). These indices thus appear to reflect processes that resemble
those engaged in mindfulness. The apparent overlap between attention bias tasks and mindful behav‐
ior—both demand engagement of attentional control processes (sustained attention and inhibition)—
makes attention bias measures particularly relevant tools for research on mindfulness. Finally, correla‐
tional studies have found a relationship between the experience of and risk for depressive symptoms
and attention bias toward sad faces; depression and vulnerability to depression thus appear to be asso‐
ciated with an emotionally dysregulated or mood congruent pattern of attentional response (Appendix
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A, Table 1; Gotlib, Kasch et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007;
Kujawa, et al., 2011). Correlational studies have also found evidence that healthy controls, relative to
depressed individuals, show attention biases toward happy faces, which may reflect a more emotionally
regulated pattern of attentional response (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007;
Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; Surguladze, et al., 2004).
Such attention biases for emotional stimuli are commonly assessed with behavioral reaction
time measures. Bias scores can be calculated by examining differences in reaction time for cues that fol‐
low different types of stimuli; if an individual responds more quickly, on average, to cues that replace
briefly displayed emotionally‐charged stimuli (e.g., sad faces) than to those that replace briefly displayed
neutral stimuli, that person is considered to show a bias to attend preferentially to emotional cues. If, in
contrast, an individual tends to respond faster to cues that are distant from emotionally‐charged stimuli,
that individual is identified as demonstrating a bias to preferentially avoid emotional cues.
To augment the information that behavioral reaction time studies can provide, some research‐
ers also collect data via eye tracking regarding the number of times an individual gazes at a stimulus (i.e.,
number of fixations) and the length of time spent looking at a stimulus (i.e., gaze duration) during an at‐
tention bias task (Duque & Vázquez, 2015; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999; Isaacowitz,
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008). Eye tracking data are limited
in that they do not capture attention shifts that are not accompanied by a measurable shift of gaze;
however, in light of evidence that there is a necessary shift of attention immediately preceding the time
of a gaze shift (Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995), it is likely that these data do capture at least
a sizable subset of attentional changes. Eye tracking attention bias research findings suggest that indi‐
viduals with mood dysregulation, compared to healthy controls, look for longer periods of time at sad
scenes (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells,
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2008; Matthews & Antes, 1992) and faces (Duque & Vázquez, 2015; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, &
Philippaerts, 2011; Appendix A, Table 2), compared to other emotional stimuli.
By gathering both behavioral reaction time and gaze duration data during a dot‐probe attention
task, it may be possible to obtain a particularly rich set of data about attention patterns for emotional
cues that reflect heightened risk for mental illnesses, including depression. Evidence that mindfulness is
associated inversely with one or more indices of attention bias could suggest that such attention pat‐
terns constitute at least one path through which individuals with higher self‐reported mindfulness re‐
spond to emotionally‐charged stimuli. To date, little is known about how patterns of attention bias for
any type of emotional cue relate to mindfulness and its components. There is evidence, however, that
self‐reported mindful attention, along with self‐reported mindful acceptance, does relate to perfor‐
mance on behavioral measures that tap such aspects of attention control as sustained focus and inhibi‐
tion. In the next section, I review this literature briefly and use it as a foundation for hypotheses about
relationships among mindful attention, mindful acceptance, and attention bias to sad faces.
1.3

Relationship between Mindfulness and Attention Processes
A number of studies, using both correlational and intervention designs, have examined associa‐

tions between self‐reported mindfulness or changes in mindfulness levels following interventions de‐
signed to increase mindful behavior and performance on measures of awareness and cognitive attention
processes (including sustained attention, inhibition, and attention switching). Complicating efforts to
summarize this research, different studies measure mindfulness in different ways, using a variety of self‐
report instruments. For example, several studies used measures that focus on a single component of
mindfulness, typically mindful attention (assessed through the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
[MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003]; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Deng, Li, & Tang, 2014; De Raedt, et al.,
2012; Jensen, Vangkilds, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2011) although mindful acceptance was measured in
one study (the Toronto Mindfulness Scale [TMS; Lau et al., 2006]; Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007).
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Other studies employed composite measures that combine items tapping multiple hypothetical compo‐
nents to yield a single mindfulness score (such as the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale, Revised
[CAMS‐R; Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007], the Five Factor Mindfulness Question‐
naire [FFMQ; Baer, et al., 2008], and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills [KIMS; Baer, Smith, &
Allen, 2004]; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009). Finally, another group of
studies compared attention task performance measured pre‐ and post‐mindfulness training to assess
effects that mindfulness interventions might have on attention processes (Anderson, Lau, Segal, &
Bishop, 2007; Chambers, Lo, & Allen 2008; De Raedt, et al., 2012; Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009;
Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; MacLean, et al.,
2010; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Semple, 2010; Tang et al., 2007; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013; Vega et al.,
2014; Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005; Zeidan et al., 2010). Broadly, although not uni‐
formly, results from this small emerging literature indicate that mindfulness correlates positively with
well‐regulated attention and that mindfulness training can contribute to improvements in attention reg‐
ulation (Table 1).
Researchers have found that mindful attention (as measured by the MAAS) is positively corre‐
lated with performance on multiple measures of sustained attention (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008;
Deng, Li, & Tang, 2014; De Raedt, et al., 2012; Jensen, Vangkilds, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2011) and inhi‐
bition (De Raedt et al., 2012; Jensen, Vangkilde, & Frokjaer, 2012). Findings regarding the relationship
between mindful attention and attention switching, however, have been mixed, with one study showing
improvement in attention switching following mindfulness training (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Has‐
selbalch, 2012) and another showing no significant improvement in attention switching after a similar
intervention (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008). In general, findings consistently suggest a positive relation‐
ship between mindful attention—a single component of mindfulness—and performance on some
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Table 1. Studies of Mindfulness and Attention
Author

N

Dx

Age

Groups

Mindfulness Task and Stimuli
Analysis
General Results
Measure
Correlational studies examining relationships between individuals components of mindfulness and attention processes
HC
33.7 10 day Vipassana
MAAS
Digit span backwards and Group x
Chambers et 20
Post‐training MAAS scores were positively
al., 2008
intervention
Internal Switching Task
testing
and moderately correlated with sustained
(IST) with both neutral
time x
attention. Intervention led to moderate im‐
20
31.9 Waitlist Control
and affective stimuli.
stimulus
provements in sustained attention, particu‐
larly toward emotional, personally relevant
emotion
stimuli. Attention switching processes were
not influenced by mindfulness training.
23
HC
21.9
MAAS
Sustained Attention Re‐
Pear‐
Deng et al.,
Mindfulness was negatively and moderately
2014
sponse Task (SART)
son’s
correlated with error rates, suggesting indi‐
Corr
viduals with higher levels of mindfulness had
better sustained attention.
45
MDD
45.2 8 week MBCT in‐
MAAS
Negative Affective Prim‐
De Raedt et
Group x
Post‐training MAAS scores were positively
al., 2012
tervention
ing with emotional face
testing
and moderately correlated with sustained
stimuli
time x
attention. Dysfunction in sustained attention
26
45.0 Waitlist control
stimulus
and inhibition found at pre‐training disap‐
emotion
peared in post‐training performance.
HC
8 week MBSR in‐
MAAS
Dual Attention to Re‐
Jensen et al., 16
Group x
Post‐training MAAS scores were positively
2012
tervention
sponse Task, Spatial and
testing
and strongly correlated with sustained at‐
Temporal Attention Net‐
time
tention and inhibition. Intervention led to
16
8 week non‐mind‐
significant improvement in sustained atten‐
work, Stroop task, d2 Test
fulness interven‐
tion and attention switching on one task
of Attention, and com‐
tion
(d2), but not on another task (DART) com‐
biTVA.
16
Waitlist Control
pared to those in the non‐mindfulness inter‐
vention.
39
HC
37
8 week MBSR in‐
TMS
Vigil Continuous Perfor‐
Anderson et
Group x
Changes in TMS scores (calculated from pre‐
al, 2007
tervention
mance Task, Stroop task,
testing
and post‐training measurement) did not pre‐
and an object detection
time x
dict improvements in sustained attention,
task
stimulus
inhibition, and attention switching. Mindful‐
condition ness intervention was also not related to
sustained attention, inhibition, and atten‐
tion switching. Mindfulness intervention led
to improvements in performance on an
awareness task.
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Correlational studies examining relationships between a composite measure of mindfulness and attention processes
Schmertz,
50
HC
20.3
MAAS,
Connors’ CPT‐2 and
Regress
Greater self‐reported mindfulness on the
Anderson, &
KIMS, and
Paced auditory serial ad‐
MAAS and CAMS‐R was moderately corre‐
Robins, 2009
CAMS‐R
dition test
lated with better sustained attention (CPT‐
2). KIMS Act with awareness was not related
to performance on either task.
Moore & Ma‐ 25
HC
28
Buddhist mindful‐ KIMS
Stroop task and d2 Test of Corr and Mindfulness was positively, related to sus‐
linowski,
ness meditators
Attention
Regress
tained attention and inhibition (moderate to
2009
large effects). Act with awareness and ob‐
25
27.5 non‐meditators
serve on the KIMS best predicted better inhi‐
bition performance on the Stroop task.
Intervention studies examining the effects of mindfulness training on attention processes
120 HC
19.4 20 minutes of Zen None
Stroop with neutral stim‐ Group
Mindfulness meditation, compared to other
Wenk‐
Sormaz, 2005
mindfulness
uli
interventions and control, led to improved
inhibition (moderate effect size).
20 minute Atten‐
tion task
20 minute Rest
HC
22
4 day mindfulness FMI
n‐back task
Group x
Zeidan et al., 24
Participants enrolled in brief mindfulness
2010
training
testing
training, compared to controls, showed im‐
time
provements in sustained attention over
time.
40
HC
5 day integrative
Tang et al.,
None
ANT with neutral stimuli
Group x
Participants enrolled in mindfulness inter‐
2007
body‐mind train‐
testing
vention were related to improvements in in‐
ing
time
hibition (large effect sizes)
40
Relaxation control
Semple, 2010 45
HC
40.2 4 week 2x/daily
None
Conners’ CPT‐2 and
Group x
Participants in the mindfulness group im‐
meditation prac‐
Stroop Task
testing
proved sustained attention over time com‐
tice
time
pared to relaxation and waitlist controls
(moderate effects). All participants im‐
Progressive Mus‐
proved on the Stroop task over time.
cle Relaxation
Waitlist
HC
54.3 8 week interven‐
None
Hayling Task; Trail Making Group x
Heeren et al, 18
Participants enrolled in the mindfulness in‐
2009
tion
A & B; GoStop paradigm
testing
tervention showed improved inhibition on
time
the Hayling task after mindfulness training
18
54.7 Waitlist control
(small to moderate effects). No differences
were seen in other tasks.
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Jha et al.,
2007

Vega et al.,
2014

17
17
17
58

HC

24

HC

35
22
29.6

43
MacLean et
al., 2010

30

28.4
HC

30

Teper &
Inzlicht, 2013

20

46

HC

18

33.0
37.5

HC

32.9

None

Attention Network Task
(ANT) with neutral stimuli

Group x
testing
time

MAAS

CPT‐2; Stroop task

Linear
mixed
models

Zen meditation
retreat
Waitlist

None

Sustained attention task
with line stimuli

> 1 year of previ‐
ous experience
No previous expe‐
rience

PHLMS

Stroop task

Hierar‐
chical
Linear
Regres‐
sion
Group x
mindful
compo‐
nent

Participants from both mindfulness groups
showed improved inhibition when compared
to controls. The retreat participants showed
greater awareness.
Mindfulness training led to improved sus‐
tained attention (CPT‐2) and improved inhi‐
bition (Stroop) over time (moderate effect
sizes).
Mindfulness training led to improvement in
sustained attention (moderate effects).

In general, meditators made fewer errors
(better inhibition). Mindful acceptance was
negatively moderately correlated with errors
on the Stroop task, suggesting that mindful
attention is related to improved inhibition.
Mindfulness meditators had better sus‐
tained attention than non‐meditators (mod‐
erate to large effect sizes).

Buddhist medita‐
None
Wilkins’ counting test
t‐test
tors
24
22
No previous
experience
* HC = Healthy Control; MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006); MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(Brown & Ryan, 2003); KIMS = Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (Baer et al, 2004); CAMS‐R = Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale‐Revised (Feld‐
man et al., 2007); PHLMS = Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al., 2008); FMI = Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (Walach, et al., 2006)
Valentine &
Sweet, 1999

19

49

8 week MBSR in‐
tervention
1 month retreat
Waitlist control
8 week MBSR in‐
tervention
Waitlist
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attention control tasks, particularly those that measure sustained attention and inhibition. Findings are
less consistent with regard to performance on attention switching tasks.
I was only able to identity one published study that examined the relationship between behavior
patterns on attention measures and self‐reported mindful acceptance. Findings from that study showed
that higher self‐reported mindful acceptance, following an 8‐week‐long mindfulness intervention
(Mindfulness‐Based Stress Reduction; MBSR), did not significantly predict performance on a variety of
measures assessing sustained attention, attention switching, and inhibition (Anderson, Lau, Segal, &
Bishop, 2007). This finding, taken together with evidence of a positive correlation between mindful at‐
tention and attention task performance, could indicate distinct patterns of association between perfor‐
mance on measures of attention control processes and mindful attention and mindful acceptance, re‐
spectively. However, such a conclusion is necessarily speculative, given the dearth of studies assessing
mindful acceptance and attention task performance.
Research has also shown positive associations between attention processes and mindfulness as
captured via composite self‐report measures, which do not distinguish among possible components of
the mindfulness construct. Within studies that have examined such associations, scores on composite
measures of mindfulness have been positively correlated with performance on measures of sustained
attention (Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009), and negatively correlated with error rates on measures
of inhibition (suggesting better inhibitory performance; Moore & Malinowski, 2009). Taken together,
findings from all studies examining relationships between mindfulness and attention control processes
suggest that self‐reported mindfulness (assessed either as a composite measure or a single component
measure) is positively related to better performance on measures of sustained attention and inhibition.
Little evidence has emerged, in contrast, in support of associations between mindfulness and attention
switching.
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Consistent with the majority of correlational study findings, mindfulness intervention studies
also yield evidence that mindfulness is related to improvement on measures of attention. In nine stud‐
ies, researchers compared pre‐ and post‐training performance differences on measures of sustained at‐
tention between healthy control participants who did not receive mindfulness training and healthy par‐
ticipants who completed either 4‐10 days of mindfulness practice (Chambers, Lo, & Allen 2008; Tang et
al., 2007, Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010), a four week daily mindfulness practice
(MacLean, et al., 2010; Semple, 2010), or an eight week MBSR course (Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot,
2009; Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Vega et al.,
2014). Generally, results across studies suggest a significant positive relationship between mindfulness
training and performance on sustained attention tasks (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Heeren, Van
Broeck, & Philippot, 2009; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; MacLean, et al., 2010; Semple, 2010; Tang,
et al., 2007; Vega, et al., 2014; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010). Additionally, one
study compared attention performance changes among a group that received mindfulness training, a
group that received a non‐mindfulness stress reduction training, and a waitlist group. Findings from this
study are mixed, but do suggest that even though both intervention groups showed improvement in
sustained attention, the mindfulness training group improved significantly more on one measure of sus‐
tained attention than the non‐mindfulness stress reduction group (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Has‐
selbalch, 2012).
Similar positive findings have emerged in studies comparing performance on tasks measuring
inhibition (in addition to sustained attention) between groups that received mindfulness intervention
and groups that did not. In one example, Wenk‐Sormaz (2005) had three groups of healthy partici‐
pants—one that completed a brief 20 minute mindfulness exercise, one that completed a cognitive
learning task, and one that was simply asked to wait—complete the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Those
who completed the mindfulness exercise, compared to other groups, showed better inhibition (i.e.,
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fewer errors in incongruent trials on the Stroop task). Additionally, one study found that formerly de‐
pressed adults who completed mindfulness training showed more improvement in inhibition and sus‐
tained attention than did healthy controls who did not receive training (De Raedt, et al., 2012). Findings
from all mindfulness intervention studies suggest that mindfulness training leads to improvements in
sustained attention and inhibition in non‐clinical samples and samples at risk for future depressive epi‐
sodes (Chambers, Lo, & Allen 2008; De Raedt, et al., 2012; Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009; Jen‐
sen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; MacLean, et al., 2010;
Semple, 2010; Tang et al., 2007; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005; Vega et al., 2014; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, Da‐
vid, & Goolkasian, 2010).
Finally, two studies have examined differences in attentional task performance between individ‐
uals who practice mindfulness regularly (e.g., via mindfulness meditation) and those who have never
practiced mindfulness. In healthy populations, mindfulness practitioners, compared to non‐practition‐
ers, made fewer errors on the Stroop task (suggesting better inhibition among practitioners; Teper &
Inzlicht, 2013) and performed more accurately on a measure of sustained attention (Wilkins’ Counting
Test, Wilkins et al., 1987; Valentine & Sweet, 1999). Findings from these studies provide further support
for the idea that mindfulness interventions lead to improved performance on measures of attention
control processes in non‐clinical samples.
Not all intervention studies, however, yield consistent findings. Inconsistencies are even appar‐
ent across studies that use the same measures of attention. Specifically, some studies show evidence of
improved performance on the Stroop task after receiving mindfulness interventions (Moore & Malinow‐
ski, 2009; Vega et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005), but others do not (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop,
2007; Semple, 2010) or only show a trend toward statistical significance (Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). It is
unclear why divergent results emerged from these studies, but sample sizes in these studies were small,
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potentially leaving the studies under‐powered and therefore vulnerable to both Type I and Type II errors
(Button, et al., 2013).
Further, the mindfulness interventions used varies across studies on several parameters, includ‐
ing content and length, which makes it difficult to make sense of differences in findings across interven‐
tion studies. Specifically, some studies found significant differences in attention task performance be‐
tween healthy controls and groups who received one 20‐minute mindfulness exercise, six weeks of
training in Buddhist meditation, or eight weeks of Mindfulness‐Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) courses
(Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Vega et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005). However, studies implementing
similar interventions, including mindfulness training with four weeks of daily meditation, eight weeks of
MBSR, or meditators who had practiced for at least one year, failed to find significant differences be‐
tween groups (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Semple, 2010; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013).
There is thus an emerging, albeit not always consistent, literature suggesting that self‐reported
mindfulness and mindfulness interventions show significant relationships with better performance on at
least some attention control tasks. Although there are a few studies that failed to find significant rela‐
tionships, the majority of studies have found that measures of mindfulness and mindfulness interven‐
tion are related to attention control processes, particularly sustained attention and inhibition. Findings
are weaker with regard to associations between mindfulness and attention switching.
1.4

Current Gaps in the Literature
Although a number of studies have examined relationships between mindfulness and attention,

yielding interesting, if complicated, findings, there remain gaps in the current literature. First, the stud‐
ies in this small body of work have typically used emotionally‐neutral attention tasks that do not allow
examination of the impact of emotionally‐charged stimuli on patterns of attention. There may be partic‐
ular value in using emotionally‐charged stimuli in research aimed at ultimately identifying mechanisms
by which mindfulness alleviates distress and regulates emotions. For example, if mindfulness decreases
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emotional dysregulation by introducing attentional flexibility that disrupts depressed people’s tendency
to ruminate or dwell on negative cues (Beck, 1967; Teasdale, 1988), then examining whether and how
mindfulness, or distinct components of mindfulness, relates to performance on tasks engaging attention
control processes in the context of emotionally‐negative cues could provide a first step toward under‐
standing the mindfulness construct.
Only two studies have considered the relationship between mindfulness and behavior patterns
of attention in the context of positively or negatively emotionally‐charged cues. Each study involved
mindfulness training (either a 10 day mindfulness meditation retreat or eight week Mindfulness‐Based
Cognitive Therapy [MBCT]) and analyses compared pre‐ and post‐training performance on tasks de‐
signed to measure sustained attention, inhibition, and attention switching in response to emotionally‐
charged stimuli (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; De Raedt et al., 2012). Findings suggest that mindfulness
training led to improvements in sustained attention and inhibition in healthy (Chambers et al., 2008) and
previously depressed individuals (De Raedt et al., 2012) when participants were presented with emo‐
tionally‐charged cues.
Not only have researchers focused on mindfulness and attention largely neglected emotion as a
salient variable, but they have also typically conceptualized mindfulness as a single, broad construct or
focused exclusively on a single component. Surprisingly few studies have attempted to more fully cap‐
ture the mindfulness construct by examining relationships among cognitive attention processes and
multiple, distinct components of mindfulness. Examining relationships among components of mindful‐
ness and attention processes allows for more precise examination of and potentially greater clarity of
the mindfulness construct.
Only two studies have examined relationships among multiple components of mindfulness and
attention processes. First, Teper and Inzlicht (2013) evaluated associations between attention task per‐
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formance and a two‐component model of mindfulness by correlating self‐reported levels of two mind‐
fulness components—attention and acceptance—with participant performance on a Stroop inhibition
task (Stroop, 1935) that used emotionally‐neutral stimuli. They found that although self‐reported mind‐
ful attention was not significantly related to any aspect of Stroop task performance, self‐reported mind‐
ful acceptance was significantly, moderately, and negatively associated with error rates, which can serve
as a measure of inhibition (higher error rates indicate poorer inhibition).
Moore and Malinowski (2009) examined associations between self‐reported mindfulness com‐
ponents and performance on a pencil and paper version of the Stroop task (administered to assess inhi‐
bition; Stroop, 1935), and the d2 concentration and endurance task (administered to assess sustained
attention and inhibition; Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998). Mindfulness was measured with the KIMS,
which assesses four components of mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with awareness, accepting
without judgement (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). Findings suggested that three of the components—act‐
ing with awareness, observing, and accepting without judgement—were significantly and moderately
correlated with better performance on measures of inhibition (on the Stroop and the d2 concentration
and endurance test) and sustained attention (on the d2 concentration and endurance test; Moore &
Malinowski, 2009). Further analysis of components of mindfulness revealed that only two mindful atten‐
tion factors on the KIMS (i.e., acting with awareness and observing) accounted for significant amounts of
variance in error rate on the Stroop test (Moore & Malinowski, 2009). Overall, their results suggest that
mindful attention, more than mindful acceptance, may predict performance on measures of attention
control processes.
Moore and Malinowski’s (2009) and Teper and Inzlicht’s (2013) findings suggest the possibility
that mindful attention and mindful acceptance may both have distinct and important relationships with
attention control processes. However, it is difficult to consider these studies’ findings in an integrated
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way, as they defined mindfulness differently. Moore and Malinowski (2009) used a definition of mind‐
fulness that proposes four components (observing, describing, acting with awareness, and accepting;
Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). Although these components ostensibly overlap, at least partially, with the
two‐component model used by Teper and Inzlicht (2013) and discussed in the present paper, no re‐
search to date has examined whether and how well these two‐ and four‐component models of mindful‐
ness align with each other. Results from these two studies (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht,
2013), despite differences in findings, provide a foundation for hypotheses about relationships among
individual components of mindfulness and attention control with emotionally‐charged stimuli.
1.5

Summary and Hypothesis
One potentially useful way to extend previous research findings that could facilitate future work

exploring mindfulness would be to examine relationships among two components of mindfulness and
attention processes using attention measures that incorporate emotionally‐charged facial expressions.
Attention bias measures, for example, which often include emotional faces as stimuli, may be good can‐
didates for such work, as they yield indices of behavioral patterns linked to attention control processes
in the context of potentially emotionally‐dysregulating stimuli.
Therefore, the current study aims to take a small step that could move us closer to understanding
how mindfulness works by examining, in a healthy sample, the two‐component model of mindfulness
and its relation to patterns of attention bias. Attention biases will be measured through both behavioral
reaction times and eye movements during a computerized dot‐probe task. Mindfulness will be meas‐
ured using the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008), a self‐report measure
based on a two‐component (attention and acceptance) model of mindfulness. Thus, I aim to investigate
common and distinct associations between scores on the PHLMS attention and acceptance subscales
and behavioral reaction time and eye tracking performance on a measure of attention bias for sad and
happy faces.
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Although no research to date has examined relationships among attention bias and components
of mindfulness in this way, several researchers have considered relationships between mindfulness and
attention control processes that suggest potential hypotheses. A review of the current literature shows
a few findings of small and statistically nonsignificant relationships between mindfulness and attention
processes (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Semple, 2010); however, the majority of study findings
suggests that mindfulness, generally, is significantly, positively, and moderately correlated with perfor‐
mance on measures of sustained attention and inhibition (Deng, et al., 2014; Heeren, Van Broeck, &
Philippot, 2009; Jensen, et al., 2012; Jha, et al., 2007; MacLean, et al., 2010; Moore & Malinowski, 2009;
Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009; Semple, 2010; Tang, et al., 2007; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013; Valentine
& Sweet, 1999; Vega, et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, et al., 2005; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Gool‐
kasian, 2010). Additionally, Chambers and colleagues (2008) and De Raedt and colleagues (2012) found
evidence that mindfulness is related to performance on measures of attention when tasks incorporate
positively and negatively emotionally‐charged stimuli.
Further, there is emerging evidence that attention and acceptance components of mindfulness
may have distinct relationships with performance on behavioral measures of cognitive attention pro‐
cesses (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). In particular, both attention and acceptance
have shown significant positive relationships with inhibition. Clarifying whether and how each mindful‐
ness component relates to attentional patterns to emotionally‐charged stimuli is a next step toward the
larger goal of clarifying the mindfulness construct.
Based on evidence that mindful attention (Moore & Malinowski, 2009) and mindful acceptance
(Teper & Inzlicht, 2013) both relate positively and moderately to performance on measures of attention
performance, I expected that scores on self‐report measures of two components of mindfulness—atten‐
tion and acceptance—would both be negatively associated with attention bias for sad faces and posi‐
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tively associated with attention bias for happy faces. Further, I predicted that moderate associations be‐
tween each mindfulness component and attention bias would remain significant, even when the other
component was included as a covariate in analyses.
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2
2.1

METHODS

Participants
One‐hundred twenty‐three female college students between the ages of 18‐24 provided in‐

formed consent to participate in this study, which was approved by the Georgia State University Institu‐
tional Review Board. Focusing exclusively on female participants removed a potential confounding vari‐
able associated with sex differences in attention control processes as there is some evidence of sex dif‐
ferences in performance on behavioral measures of attention (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005;
Merritt et al., 2007; Smith & Waterman, 2005). Additionally, only individuals between the ages of 18‐24
were included in order to remove potential confounds associated with developmental differences (as
some evidence suggests that youths and older adults may show different patterns of attention bias for
emotional stimuli; Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson,
2006; Rubia, Hyde, Halari, Giampietro, & Smith, 2010). The average age of the participants was 19.74
(Median = 19; Standard Deviation = 1.74). The participants were racially and ethnically diverse (see Ta‐
ble 2 for demographic details).
Table 2. Demographic Variables

N
Age
Race

Ethnicity

Mean (SD)
Median
African
American
Caucasian
American
Asian American
Other
Hispanic/Latino

Whole Sample

Attention Bias Sample

Eye Tracking Sample

(N = 123)
123
19.74 (1.73)
19

(N = 104)
104
19.78 (1.75)
19

(N = 86)
86
19.71 (1.72)
19

49.59%

49.04%

50.00%

30.57%

33.65%

29.07%

13.22%
6.61%
12.5%

10.58%
6.73%
13.46%

15.12%
5.81%
12.79%
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Complete behavioral data were obtained for 104 participants and usable eye movement data
were collected for 88 participants. Data loss resulted from both human and computer errors. Initial in‐
spection of the data revealed two participants who looked minimally (limited gaze duration) at the faces
displayed during dot‐probe trials; their data were thus excluded from eye tracking analysis, reducing the
sample size for eye tracking participants to 86. Demographic characteristics of the subgroups of partici‐
pants with behavioral data and/or eye tracking data did not differ significantly from those of the sample
as a whole (see Table 2).
2.2

Procedure
Participants completed all study procedures, which comprised self‐report questionnaires and a

computerized attention bias task during which eye movements were recorded, in a university lab space
after providing informed consent. Order of presentation for self‐report measures and the task was
counterbalanced, such that half of the participants completed measures before the task and the other
half completed the task before the measures. Full participation took less than one hour.
2.3

Measures
2.3.1

Demographic information.

Participants completed a brief questionnaire regarding their demographic information, including
information about participant age, ethnicity, and race (Appendix B).
2.3.2

Measure of mindfulness.

Designed to be a concise measure of the two‐component construct of mindfulness, the Philadel‐
phia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Appendix C), includes items that tap acceptance and items that tap
awareness/attention (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). Participants rated the
frequency with which they experienced each item in the past week using a 5‐point Likert‐type scale (1 =
never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, and 5 = very often). To obtain the Awareness subscale score,
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all odd‐numbered items were totaled; higher scores reflect higher levels of awareness. To obtain the
Acceptance subscale, all even‐numbered items were reverse scored and totaled; higher scores reflect
higher levels of acceptance. Cardaciotto and colleagues (2008) found small correlations (ranging from ‐
.02 to ‐.13) between the PHLMS Awareness and Acceptance subscales in two non‐clinical and two clini‐
cal samples, which they interpreted as suggesting that the subscales measure relatively distinct aspects
of the mindfulness construct.
Cardaciotto and colleagues (2008) found evidence that the PHLMS is psychometrically reliable.
In their study, the PHLMS exhibited high internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of
.81 for awareness and .85 for acceptance). Corrected item‐subscale total correlations ranged from .43
to .60 for awareness and .47 to .67 for acceptance. Cardaciotto et al. (2008) also found evidence of con‐
vergent and discriminant validity for the two PHLMS subscales. Specifically, scores on the Awareness
scale of the PHLMS correlated moderately with scores on another measure of mindful attention (MAAS,
r = .21) and the Reflection subscale of the Rumination Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; r = .36). The Ac‐
ceptance scale of the PHLMS was highly correlated with other measures of acceptance (Acceptance and
Action Questionnaire, r = .54; the White Bear Suppression Inventory, r = ‐.52) and moderately correlated
with separate measure of mindful attention (MAAS, r =.32) and the Rumination scale of the RRQ (r = ‐
.40). Scores on the Acceptance scale of the PHLMS were not significantly related to scores on the reflec‐
tion scale of the RRQ (r = ‐.02; Cardaciotto et al., 2008).
2.4

Attention Bias Task
During each of the 84 trials that constitute this computer‐based measure of attention bias toward

emotional cues, participants viewed an initial fixation cross (a plus sign) for 500 ms, followed by a face
pair (happy/neutral, sad/neutral, angry/neutral, neutral/neutral, with one face on the right and one on
the left of the screen) that remained on the screen for 3000 ms (Figure 1). This presentation time is con‐
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Sample Trial

Duration (ms)

Event

500

Fixate

3000

Sad/Neutral

1000

Probe
(button press)

+

*

Figure 1. Attention Bias Task
sistent with previous eye tracking studies (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Sears Newman, Fer‐
ence, & Thomas, 2011) and has been shown to be reliable for measurement of attention bias using eye
tracking (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). After a face pair was presented, an aster‐
isk appeared in the position previously occupied by one face and participants were asked to indicate the
asterisk’s location by pressing the “1” key on the computer keyboard to indicate the left side and press‐
ing “2” to indicate the right side of the screen. The asterisk appeared on each side of the screen an
equal number of times and replaced emotional and neutral faces an equal number of times.
Stimuli were presented against a black background, consistent with previous presentations of
this measure (Mogg, Bradley, Dixon, Fisher, Twelftree, & McWilliams, 2000). Each emotional expression
(happy, sad, and angry) was paired with a neutral expression, resulting in 24 sad/neutral pairs, 24
happy/neutral pairs, 24 angry/neutral pairs, and 12 neutral/neutral pairs (see Appendix D for examples
of face pairs). Total task time was 18 minutes.
Visual stimuli used in this task consisted of 84 black and white pictures of faces with sad, happy,
angry, or neutral expressions (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib,
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Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Kellough, et al., 2008;
Kujawa et al., 2011; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; Mathews & Antes, 1992). Facial
expressions were selected from a pool that comprised four sets of validated images: the NimStim set
(Tottenham et al., 2009), the Productive Aging Laboratory set (Minear & Park, 2004), images used by
Bradley and colleagues (1997) in a widely‐used dot‐probe task version, and the GSU Diverse Faces set
(Schmidt, Davis, & Tone, 2012). The 84 images used in the present dot‐probe task were selected as
good exemplars of different expressions based on undergraduate students’ ratings of how well they rep‐
resented the emotion they were intended to convey and how distinct they were from other emotional
expressions (Schmidt & Tone, 2014).
2.5

Behavioral Reaction Time
Based on prior attention bias research (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al.,

2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Kujawa et al., 2011; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), attention bias
scores were computed separately for each emotional expression using the following equation:
Attention bias = ½[(RaLe – RaRe) + (LaRe – LaLe)]
Within this equation, ‘R’ represented the right position, ‘L’ represented the left position, ‘a’ represented
the asterisk, and ‘e’ represented the emotional expression. For example, RaLe represented the mean
reaction time when the asterisk was in the right position and the emotional expression (sad, angry, or
happy) was in the left position. Positive scores indicated an attentional bias toward the spatial locations
of emotional expressions relative to matched neutral faces, and negative values indicated a bias to di‐
rect attention away from the spatial locations of emotional expressions. Attention bias scores for sad
faces and for happy faces served as dependent variables in this study.
Only response time data from correct responses (when the key press corresponded accurately
with the probe position) were included in bias score calculations. The error rate was less than 1% of all
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data (consistent with published error rates; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib,
2007).
2.6

Eye Tracking
2.6.1

Eye movement recording.

Eye tracking measurements were gathered in addition to behavioral reaction times, as research‐
ers have expressed uncertainty about the degree to which behavioral reaction times reflect attention as
opposed to fine motor ability (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Nummenmaa et al., 2006).
Measuring total gaze fixation, or the amount of time that gaze is directed toward a visual target, pro‐
vides complementary information about attention that depends on fewer intervening motor processes
than manual reaction time measures (Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011). Gaze fixation
measures of attention bias have also been shown to be reliable across trials and participants (Waechter,
Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014).
In the present study, eye movement was recorded using an Applied Science Laboratories (ASL)
Model 504 eye tracker, equipped with remote pan and tilt optic. After initial gaze calibration, eye move‐
ments were measured via continuous recording with high‐resolution infrared oculography of points of
gaze on a stationary object in the environment (in this case, a computer screen; Applied Science Labora‐
tories [ASL] Model 504, Boston). The tracker sampled eye position at a rate of 120 Hz, with precision
that is better, according to the manual, than .5°visual angle, and spatial error of less than one degree.
Points of gaze were determined by continually calculating the relationship between the corneal reflec‐
tion of a near infrared beam that was projected to the eye and the center of the illuminated pupil as the
eye rotated. The possibility of artifacts due to head movement was minimized through use of an autofo‐
cusing lens and a chin rest (eye‐screen distance was 19 inches for all participants).
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2.6.2

Eye Movement data processing.

Raw eye movement data were processed with the Eyenal Data Analysis Program (ASL supplied
software). This program calculated gazes based on an algorithm that accounts for the distance from the
eye to the screen, which was kept uniform across participants. Fixation location was defined by compar‐
ing the point‐of‐gaze cursor with a grid of coordinates that corresponded to positions on the computer
screen. Consistent with the literature (Caseras, Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Waechter et al., 2014)
and the program’s default algorithm, a fixation was defined as a condition in which the eye remained
within fixed coordinates for a period equal to or in excess of 100 milliseconds (ms). Fixations on two re‐
gions of the computer screen (the left third and the right third) were used in analyses as indices of at‐
tention to the left or right image in a pair.
Total duration of gaze at each face in a pair was calculated by summing the duration of all fixa‐
tions on the side of the screen where the face appeared. These data were then exported to SPSS and
gaze fixations were summed across trials to yield total scores for each participant that represented time
spent focusing attention at each type of emotional expression (sad, happy, angry, and neutral). Total
gaze duration for sad faces and total gaze duration for happy faces served as dependent variables in the
present study.
2.7

Power Analysis
Sample size was determined prior beginning the study and was based on power analyses con‐

ducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) utilizing analysis for a linear regression
with two tested components of mindfulness: attention and acceptance. Alpha error probability was set
at .05 and power was set at 80%. Two power analyses were completed to assess necessary sample size
for behavioral reaction time analyses. First, because Teper and Inzlicht (2013) have been the only re‐
searchers to assess the contributions of both hypothesized components of mindfulness to performance
on attention measures, power analysis was completed based on their findings, which yielded an effect
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size of f2 = .11. Results of this analysis suggest that a sample size of 88 participants is necessary to de‐
tect significant associations. Second, Moore and Malinowski (2009) also considered effects of specific
components of mindfulness on performance on attention measures. Power analysis based on their find‐
ings, which yielded effect sizes of f2 =.78 and f2 = 1.33, resulting in sample sizes of 16 and 11, respec‐
tively.
Finally, a separate power analysis was completed for eye tracking analyses. Because Caseras
and colleagues (2007) completed an eye tracking attention bias study with emotional stimuli presented
for three seconds; power analysis was completed based on their findings, which yielded an effect size of
f2 = .33. Results of this analysis suggest that a sample size of 76 participants would be necessary to de‐
tect significant associations. Based on all analyses, our final sample size was large enough to maximize
power and reduce the potential for Type II error.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
The final sample consisted of 104 participants with complete dot‐probe data and 86 participants

with complete eye tracking data. Before conducting correlational and regression analyses, descriptive
statistics were calculated. Descriptive statistics were calculated separately for participants with com‐
plete behavioral data and those with complete eye tracking data (Tables 3 and 4).
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Behavioral Dot‐probe Data (N=104)
Variable

Mean

Range

Variance

Skew

Kurtosis

3.05
26.81

Standard
Deviation
1.75
5.18

Age
PHLMS
Attention
PHLMS
Acceptance
Attention Bias
to Sad Faces
Attention Bias
to Happy
Faces

19.78
38.94

Min
18
26

Max
24
50

1.18
‐.02

.62
‐.40

25.22

10

40

45.94

6.78

‐.13

‐.59

‐2.62

‐92.94

87.55

1133.00

33.66

.37

.31

6.03

‐102.45

91.41

915.18

30.25

‐.23

1.12

Skew

Kurtosis

1.17
‐.18

.56
.52

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Gaze Duration Data (N=86)
Variable
Age
PHLMS
Attention
PHLMS
Acceptance
Gaze Duration
for Sad Faces
Gaze Duration
for Happy
Faces

Mean
19.71
38.91

Min
18
25

Range
Max
24
49

Variance
2.94
31.57

Standard
Deviation
1.71
5.62

25.14

10

40

48.67

6.98

‐.12

‐.71

39.82

4.12

65.28

242.40

15.57

‐.89

.04

39.56

3.77

63.63

247.33

15.73

‐.82

‐.19

All four of the dependent variables—reaction‐time based sad and happy attention bias scores
and gaze durations for sad and happy faces—met the majority of assumptions for linear regression (see
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Appendix E). However, gaze duration variables of attention bias for happy and sad faces showed a sig‐
nificant negative skew. Therefore, these variables were transformed using a square transformation to
normalize data. Descriptive statistics with these transformed variables are given below (Table 5).
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Gaze Duration Following a Square Transformation (N=86)
Variable

Mean

Range

Variance

Skew

Kurtosis

2.94
31.57

Standard
Deviation
1.71
5.62

Age
PHLMS
Attention
PHLMS
Acceptance
Gaze Duration
for Sad Faces
Gaze Duration
for Happy
Faces

19.71
38.91

Min
18
25

Max
24
49

1.17
‐.18

.56
.52

25.14

10

40

48.67

6.98

‐.12

‐.71

1809.09

14.25

4049.29

1163683.60

1078.74

‐.05

‐.84

1825.09

17.00

4260.83

1126981.22

1061.59

‐.05

‐.55

The square transformation minimized the skewness of the gaze duration variables. As expected,
the square transformation also impacted the kurtosis of the data; however, the resulting values were
inside normal or acceptable ranges. Therefore, the transformed gaze duration variables were used in
subsequent analyses.
3.2

Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale
The psychometric properties of the PHLMS were assessed in the present sample. The PHLMS

showed high internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of α = .79 overall, α = .75 for
awareness and α = .84 for acceptance). The subscales of the PHLMS were also minimally correlated with
each other (r = .09, p = .32).
3.3

Preliminary Analyses
Bivariate correlations were computed among age, mindfulness subscale scores (PHLMS‐aware‐

ness and PHLMS‐acceptance), attention bias scores, and total gaze fixation times for happy and sad
faces. Age was significantly, and positively associated with PHLMS Acceptance score (p < .05). No other
correlations were statistically significant (Table 6 and 7).
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Table 6. Bivariate Correlations among Age, PHLMS, and Attention Bias Dot‐probe Responses (N=104)
Age
Age
PHLMS
Attention
PHLMS
Acceptance
Bias to Sad Faces
Bias to Happy
Faces
* indicates a significant correlation at p < .05

PHLMS
Attention
‐.01

PHLMS
Acceptance
.36*
‐.03

Bias to Sad
Faces
‐.01
‐.02

Bias to Happy
Face
.16
‐.05

.00

.09
‐.17

Table 7. Bivariate Correlations among Age, PHLMS, and Gaze Durations (N=86)
Age

PHLMS
Attention

Age
‐.01
PHLMS
Attention
PHLMS
Acceptance
Bias to Sad Faces
Bias to Happy
Faces
Gaze
Duration for Sad
Faces
Gaze
Duration for
Happy Faces
* indicates a significant correlation at p < .05

PHLMS
Accept

Bias to
Sad Faces

Bias to
Happy
Face

Gaze
Duration
Sad Faces

.31*
‐.03

.05
.00

.15
‐.10

‐.12
.04

Gaze
Duration
Happy
Faces
‐.06
.03

.04

.08

.13

.09

‐.25*

‐.08
.10

‐.11
.17
.91*

Behavioral reaction times were not significantly correlated with gaze fixation durations for dif‐
ferent emotional expression types. Specifically, attention bias reaction times and gaze fixation times
were not significantly correlated for sad faces (r = ‐.08, p = .49) or for happy faces (r = .17, p = .14).
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) yielded evidence that scores on the PHLMS acceptance subscale
differed across racial groups in both the sample with complete dot‐probe data, F(3, 100)=3.0, p < .05
and the sample with complete eye tracking data, F(3, 81) = 2.78, p = .05. T‐tests also indicated differ‐
ences between participants who identified as Hispanic and those who identified as non‐Hispanic, in both
the reaction time data sample, t(102) = 2.02, p < .05, and the eye tracking data sample, t(84) = 2.30, p <
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.05. ANOVAs and t‐tests comparing racial and ethnic groups on the PHLMS awareness subscale and on
attention bias measures and total gaze duration measures produced nonsignificant results (all p’s > .05;
see Appendix F).
3.4

Regression Analysis
Linear regression analyses were conducted using SPSS (PASW Statistics 18) to assess relation‐

ships between components of mindfulness, operationalized as PHLMS Attention and Acceptance scores,
and attention bias. Four models were tested in order to assess associations among mindful attention
(PHLMS Awareness) and mindful acceptance (PHLMS Acceptance) and each of the four dependent varia‐
bles, which comprised attention bias scores for happy faces and for sad faces, as well as total gaze fixa‐
tion on sad faces and on happy faces. Linear regression assumptions were probed to determine if linear
regression analysis was appropriate; data met assumptions of independence and normality (see Appen‐
dix E).
Results from the first regression analysis predicting performance on the dot‐probe attention
bias task for sad faces were not significant, F(2,101) = .01, p = .99. Neither mindful attention (β = ‐.02, p
= .87), nor mindful acceptance (β = .00, p = 1.00), accounted for significant proportions of the variance in
sad bias scores (R2 = .00; Table 8). Similar results emerged from the second regression model, predicting
happy attention bias, F(2,101) = .57, p = .57; neither mindful attention (β = ‐.05, p = .63) nor mindful ac‐
ceptance (β = .09, p = .35) accounted for significant proportions of the variance in happy bias scores (R2
= .01; Table 9).

Table 8. Linear Regression Analysis for Relationships among Components of Mindfulness and Atten‐
tion Bias to Sad Faces (Dot‐probe, N = 104).
Model

Constant
Attention
Acceptance

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
1.54
‐.11
.00

Std. Error
30.25
.65
.49

Standardized
Coefficients
β
‐.02
.00

t

Significance

.05
‐.17
‐.01

.96
.87
1.00
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Table 9. Linear Regression Analysis for Relationships among Components of Mindfulness and Atten‐
tion Bias to Happy Faces (Dot‐probe, N = 104).
Model

Constant
Attention
Acceptance

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
31.26
‐.28
.41

Std. Error
27.04
.58
.44

Standardized
Coefficients
β
‐.05
.09

t

Significance

1.16
‐.48
.93

.25
.63
.35

Results from the third regression analysis predicting performance on the eye tracking attention
bias task for sad faces were non‐significant, F(2,82) = .82, p = .44. Neither mindful attention (β = .05, p =
.68) nor mindful acceptance (β = .13, p = .22), accounted for significant proportions of the variance in
gaze durations for sad faces (R2 = .02; Table 10). Similar results emerged from the fourth regression
model, predicting happy attention bias, F(2,82) = .40, p = .67; neither mindful attention (β = .04, p = .76)
nor mindful acceptance (β = .09, p = .40) accounted for significant proportions of the variance in gaze
durations for happy faces (R2 = .01; Table 11).

Table 10. Linear Regression Analysis for Relationships among Components of Mindfulness and Atten‐
tion Bias to Sad Faces (Eye Tracking, N = 86).
Model

Constant
Attention
Acceptance

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
2196.48
8.60
20.26

Std. Error
977.389
20.55
16.55

Standardized
Coefficients
β
.05
.13

t

Significance

2.25
.42
1.22

.03
.68
.22

Table 11. Linear Regression Analysis for Relationships among Components of Mindfulness and Atten‐
tion Bias to Happy Faces (Eye Tracking, N = 86).
Model

Constant
Attention
Acceptance

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
2051.22
6.62
14.38

Std. Error
998.34
21.06
17.02

Standardized
Coefficients
β
.04
.09

t

Significance

2.06
.32
.85

.04
.75
.40
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4

Discussion

The current study was designed to examine associations between two components of mindful‐
ness—attention and acceptance—and patterns of performance on measures of attention bias to emo‐
tional stimuli. Several researchers have suggested that attention bias tasks place demands on the atten‐
tion control processes of sustained attention and inhibition (Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib, Krasnoper‐
ova, et al., 2004; Joormann, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), both of which have been linked to mindful‐
ness in prior research. Further, attention bias tasks often include emotional images or words as distrac‐
tors; this characteristic makes them particularly relevant for research on mindfulness, which is often
used to facilitate tolerance and acceptance of emotions that are strong or uncomfortable.
Specifically, I predicted that scores on self‐report measures of both components of mindfulness
would be negatively and moderately associated with attention bias for sad faces and would be positively
and moderately associated with attention bias for happy faces. Further, I predicted that each mindful‐
ness component would independently account for a significant portion of variance in attention bias
scores, even when the other component was covaried. Such findings would suggest that each compo‐
nent of mindfulness has a distinct and necessary role in attention patterns that emerge in response to
emotionally‐dysregulating stimuli.
Findings from the present study did not support study hypotheses. Specifically, self‐reported
mindful attention and mindful acceptance were not significantly associated with reaction time or gaze
duration measures of attention bias for sad or happy faces. These findings could suggest that self‐per‐
ceived mindful attention and mindful acceptance are not related to objectively measured patterns of
biased attention for emotional cues in a college sample. However, this conceptualization is not con‐
sistent with evidence from previous studies, the majority of which have found significant relationships
generally between mindfulness and performance on attention tasks involving sustained attention
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(Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Deng, Li, & Tang, 2014; De Raedt, et al., 2012; Heeren, Van Broeck, & Phil‐
ippot, 2009; Jensen, Vangkilds, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2011; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Mac‐
Lean, et al., 2010; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009; Semple, 2010; Tang
et al., 2007; Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Vega et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond,
David, & Goolkasian, 2010), inhibition (De Raedt et al., 2012; Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch,
2012; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Vega et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005), and, in one case, attention
switching (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012).
This study, however, is not the first to fail to find significant associations between measures of
attention processes and mindfulness. For example, Anderson, Lau, Segal and Bishop (2007) found that
mindfulness training did not affect performance on several measures of attention control processes (in‐
cluding measures of sustained attention, inhibition, and attention switching). Additionally, two other
studies found that a mindfulness intervention did not significantly improve performance on a measure
of inhibition (Semple, 2010; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013) and one study failed to find a significant relationship
between performance on a measure of attention switching and self‐reported mindfulness (Chambers,
Lo, & Allen, 2008).
Some inconsistencies between the present study and prior work could reflect differences in the
ways that mindfulness is conceptualized across studies. However, the present findings are also incon‐
sistent with those from the two studies that used a comparable multi‐component model of mindfulness.
These studies found evidence that mindful attention (Moore & Malinowski, 2009) and mindful ac‐
ceptance (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013) were each related to inhibition, as indexed
by number of errors on the Stroop task. Additionally, Moore and Malinowski (2009) found evidence
that sustained attention was correlated with multiple components of mindfulness, which included atten‐
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tion and acceptance components of mindfulness. In light of the present study and these previous stud‐
ies, further research is needed to clarify the relationships among mindful attention, mindful acceptance,
sustained attention, and inhibition.
In the following sections, I attempt to make sense of these inconsistencies, drawing on relevant
empirical and theoretical literatures. In addition, I review limitations of the present study that may have
contributed to the failure to detect predicted associations and identify future directions that could im‐
prove our understanding of the mindfulness construct.
4.1

Alternative Understanding of Attention Processes in Attention Biases
4.1.1

Alternate Mechanisms of Attention Biases

Although several researchers have suggested that the dot‐probe measure of attention bias for
sad stimuli engages sustained attention and inhibition (Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et
al., 2004; Joormann, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), there is also some suggestion that alternative at‐
tentional control processes are engaged in the dot‐probe task. Specifically, some researchers suggest
that the dot‐probe attention bias task measures the ability to disengage from negative or threatening
stimuli (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006;
Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005). From an attentional control perspective, such
disengagement would require the ability to inhibit and shift focus away from specific stimuli, rather than
the ability to sustain attention toward those stimuli. In this conceptualization, then, attention biases to‐
ward emotional stimuli would be driven by difficulties with inhibition and attention switching and not
necessarily sustained attention.
If it is true that the dot‐probe attention bias task assesses inhibition and attention switching,
then the results of the present study could be interpreted as consistent with previous research. As
noted previously, the literature is mixed regarding whether or not mindfulness significantly correlates
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with performance on inhibition (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & Bishop, 2007; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Sem‐
ple, 2010; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013; Vega et al., 2014; Wenk‐Sormaz, 2005) and attention switching
measures (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012). Therefore,
the present study could provide evidence that aligns with other findings that mindfulness is not signifi‐
cantly related to the attention processes of inhibition and attention switching.
This conceptualization, however, leaves open the possibility that mindfulness may work through
the ability to sustain attention toward selected stimuli, and not inhibition of or switching from emo‐
tional stimuli in the internal and external environment. Therefore, if this alternative explanation is cor‐
rect, further research is needed to assess relationships among components of mindfulness and sus‐
tained attention toward potentially emotionally‐dysregulating stimuli.
4.1.2

Alternate Mechanisms of Mindfulness

It is possible that there are additional conceptualizations of the results that may explain the lack
of significant findings in the present study that might also support hypothesized relationships among
components of mindfulness and attention bias to sad faces. It is possible that components of mindful‐
ness could help people to engage with emotional stimuli in ways that are not reflected on measures of
visual attention biases. Specifically, Bishop and colleagues (2004) suggest that mindfulness, and particu‐
larly mindful attention, directs focus to the present moment and inhibits the elaboration of mood‐con‐
gruent cognitions. For example, mindfulness could disrupt internal cognitive attention biases in ways
that interrupt rumination and other sustained patterns of negative thinking (Beck, 1976; Joormann,
2009; Nolen‐Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen‐Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lynbomirsky, 2008; Treynor, Gonzalez, & No‐
len‐Hoeksema, 2003; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). This conceptualization of mindful‐
ness could suggest that components of mindfulness could contribute to mental health by disrupting cog‐
nitive attention biases, such as rumination, rather than visual attention biases. Testing this hypothetical
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pattern of relationships could be another useful step toward understanding mindfulness and how it
works.
4.2

Methodological Differences and Limitations
Additionally, methodological factors may have contributed to inconsistencies between the pre‐

sent findings and those from prior research. In particular, the focus in the present research on attention
biases for emotional cues, measured via both reaction time and eye movements, rather than on perfor‐
mance on general measures of attention processes sets the present study apart from earlier work. In
addition, studies have varied considerably in the measures that they have selected to tap mindfulness. I
discuss both of these issues in detail below.
4.2.1

Attention bias versus other attention measures.

The present study revolved around a measure of one very specific type of attentional pattern—
attention bias for sad cues. There is considerable evidence that the dot‐probe is a valid measure of at‐
tention biases in both healthy and populations at risk for mental illness (Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib,
Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). Further, attention bias for sad
cues, measured using dot‐probe tasks, has been suggested to index sustained attention and inhibition
(Eizenman et al., 2003; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007).
Surprisingly, although attention bias seems like a viable target for examining mindfulness, there do not
appear to be other published studies to date that have used dot‐probe or comparable tasks in the con‐
text of research on mindfulness and how it relates to other constructs.
Differences from other studies in terms of the attention measures used complicates compari‐
sons of the present results with those from earlier research, as this study is the first to have examined
relationships among components of mindfulness and attention biases to emotionally‐charged stimuli.
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This focus sets it apart from the majority of previous studies in the literature on mindfulness and atten‐
tion, each of which had participants complete various other attention tasks. These tasks included the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), a continuous performance task (e.g., Conners’ CPT‐II; Conners, 2000), the d2
Test of Attention (Brickenkamp, 2002; Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998), the Attention Network Task (Fan,
McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002), and other attention processing measures.
Whether and how attention biases relate to performance on other types of attentional control
(e.g., sustained attention, inhibition, or attention switching) tasks remains unclear. I was unable to lo‐
cate research that examined associations between attention biases and performance on the Stroop task
(Stroop, 1935), the d2 Test of Attention (Brickenkamp, 2002; Brickenkamp, & Zillmer, 1998), or other
measures of attention. Additionally, only a few previous studies have included emotionally‐charged
stimuli (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; De Raedt, et al., 2012) that may capture attention particularly
strongly for individuals with or at risk for mood dysregulation (Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). It is
possible, therefore, that differences in tasks may account for some of the differences in findings across
studies.
Further, issues with the reliability of dot‐probe tasks, particularly in non‐clinical, healthy popula‐
tions, may also have contributed to the unexpected pattern of findings in the current sample. Research
into the reliability of dot‐probe task versions that use angry/threatening words, scenes (Schmukle,
2005), and faces (Staugaard, 2009) as attentional cues has led some researchers to express concerns
about the psychometric properties of such measures. For example, findings suggest that the temporal
stability of dot‐probe task performance, as reflected in indices derived from reaction times, may be lim‐
ited. Although Schmukle (2005) found some evidence of test‐retest reliability for a version of the dot‐
probe that used physical threat words (r = .32), other published reliability estimates have been small and
statistically nonsignificant (Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009). In addition, one recent study examined
the test‐retest reliability of various ways of measuring attention bias via the dot‐probe task and found
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moderate reliability ratings in clinically anxious adult populations (interclass correlation coefficients [ICC]
ranging between .49 and .55) and healthy pediatric populations (ICC of .53) when attention bias scores
were calculated for trials only when the probe was placed on the bottom of the screen rather than on
top (stimulus pairs were arranged vertically rather than horizontally, as in the present study; Price, et al.,
2015). The relevance of these reliability estimates to the current measure is unclear; all of these reliabil‐
ity studies examined angry/threatening, rather than sad, stimuli and presented those stimuli for shorter
durations (100‐675 ms) than the 3000 ms duration used in the present study.
Examinations of the dot‐probe task’s internal consistency have also generally yielded minimal
and nonsignificant results. Internal consistency ratings for attention bias tasks with threat words, scenes
and faces are small and nonsignificant (Cronbach’s α ranging between .00 and .28 for words and scenes
[Schmukle, 2005] and ‐.52 and .04 for faces [Staugaard, 2009]; split‐half reliabilities ranging between ‐
.19 and .03 for words and scenes [Schmukle, 2005] and ‐.29 and .17 for faces [Staugaard, 2009]). Addi‐
tionally, Bar‐Haim and colleagues (2007) obtained significant and moderate split‐half reliability esti‐
mates (r = .45) for the dot‐probe paradigm in non‐clinical samples of individuals living near the Gaza
Strip who experienced high levels of daily anxiety (Bar‐Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans‐Kranenburg, &
van IJzendoorn, 2007).
Two studies to date have assessed the reliability of eye tracking measures of attention bias. One
study examined reliabilities for stimuli displayed at each 500 ms interval between 0 and 5,000 ms
(Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). The authors note that at shorter presentation
times (between 0 and 2,500 ms) reliability estimates for the eye tracking attention bias task were non‐
significant and low to moderate (between r = ‐1.06 and r = .55; Cronbach’s α between α = ‐1.55 and α =
0.55); however, for task versions that presented stimuli for 3,000 ms or longer, the authors suggest that
internal consistency measured as split‐half reliability (between r = .60 and r = .68) and Cronbach’s α reli‐
ability (between α = .50 and α = .63) were significant and moderate (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, &
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Oakman, 2014). Another study examined the reliability of eye tracking measures of attention bias and
found moderate to good reliability ratings when eye tracking measures were averaged across all trials
(rather than looking individually at each trial) in clinically anxious adult populations (ICC ranging be‐
tween .69 and .96) and healthy pediatric populations (ICC of .68; Price, et al., 2015).
Notably, the present study yielded little evidence that reaction time attention bias scores re‐
lated to gaze durations for either sad faces or happy faces. It may thus be worth considering the possi‐
bility that reaction time‐based bias scores and gaze duration indices reflect different constructs (e.g.,
motor behavior, eye moment behavior, or different facets of attention). It is also possible that partici‐
pants are initially attentive (e.g., bottom‐up processing) to sad faces but avoid gazing at them (e.g., top‐
down processing such as inhibition), which would affect both reaction time and gaze duration attention
bias scores. More precisely documenting how participant responses unfold over the course of a trial for
both measures may help elucidate the failure to detect an association between the two measures of
bias used in this study.
Finally, it is possible that individuals shifted gaze frequently (e.g., top‐down processes such as
attention switching) between the two stimuli presented as a pair during each trial. Specifically, switching
gaze frequently between emotional and neutral stimuli could lead to inconsistent attention bias and
gaze duration scores. Such a variable pattern of attention could contribute to a lack of relationship be‐
tween reactions to a probe and total length of time participants gazed at stimuli.
4.2.2

Measure of mindfulness concerns

The approach to conceptualizing and measuring mindfulness used in the present study may also
have contributed to the failure to detect significant effects. First, the PHLMS mindful attention subscale,
like other widely used mindfulness self‐report measures (e.g., the Mindful Attentive Awareness Scale;
Brown & Ryan, 2003), includes items that reflect awareness and attention control processes, which the
theoretical and empirical literature typically present as orthogonally related (Brown & Ryan, 2003; 2004;
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De Raedt et al., 2012; Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Posner & Peterson, 1990;
Washburn, Latzman, Schultz, & Bramlett, 2015). Additionally, other authors suggest that awareness
(which is a bottom‐up attention process) and attentional control (which is a top‐down attention process)
may either work together or compete for attentional resources (Washburn, Latzman, Schultz, & Bram‐
lett, 2015). The combination of these two attention factors within a single measure of mindful attention
may have influenced results. Specifically, it is possible that only one attention factor is related to atten‐
tion biases or that both were related in opposite directions. Both of these possibilities could have led to
the small and nonsignificant relationship between mindful attention and attention bias to sad faces.
Second, Bergomi and colleagues (2013) have raised questions about whether the PHLMS ac‐
ceptance subscale is appropriately titled. They suggest that the subscale may “capture experiential
avoidance” (p. 195), while failing to tap positive acceptance, non‐reactivity, and non‐judgment. Alt‐
hough these concepts may sound as if they are inversely related to each other, Bergomi and colleagues’
(2013) observation serves as a reminder that they may show other patterns of association. The PHLMS
acceptance subscale, therefore, may not fully capture mindful acceptance. Therefore, results may sug‐
gest that experiential avoidance is not related to attention bias to sad or happy faces, which does not
clarify relationships between mindful acceptance and attention biases.
4.3

Future Research
There are a number of directions that future research might take in order to clarify the lack of

significant findings from the present study and to more effectively examine whether and how the two‐
component model of mindfulness relates to attention bias for emotional stimuli. First, there is evidence
that attention biases for sad stimuli are commonly observed in the context of depression (Gotlib, Kasch
et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Kujawa et al., 2011) and that
more depressed individuals tend to show stronger biases (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoper‐
ova, et al., 2004; Joormann, 2004). Therefore, there may be value in replicating the present study in a
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clinically depressed sample, or in a sample that includes both clinical and non‐clinical participant, as
such a samples could allow a larger range of individual variability in all measures (PHLMS attention,
PHLMS acceptance, and reaction times and gaze fixations for attention biases). This larger range in
scores could potentially lead to more clearly identified relationships among variables that could help
clarify the construct of mindfulness. Although such work was beyond the scope of the present study,
results of exploratory analyses on data from a small subsample of participants who endorsed high levels
of depressive symptoms raise the possibility that mindful attention (as measured by the PHLMS Aware‐
ness scale) may relate positively with attention bias to sad faces in people who are experiencing depres‐
sion (see Appendix G), even if no significant association is observed in a healthy sample.
Second, mindfulness may protect against mental illness by modulating additional cognitive and
behavioral processes besides attention bias for sad cues. For example, there is evidence that cognitive
biases in response to emotionally‐charged stimuli could be measured by evaluating rumination (Joor‐
mann, 2009; Nolen‐Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lynbomirsky, 2008; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen‐Hoeksema,
2003). Such patterns of rumination can be measured using the Rumination Response Scale (RRS; Trey‐
nor, Gonzalez, & Nolen‐Hoeksema, 2003), which was designed to assess cognitive attention biases in
thought patterns. Therefore, mindfulness could change how people engage with emotionally‐charged
stimuli by normalizing cognitive and behavioral patterns, including rumination. Research examining re‐
lationships among components of mindfulness and these cognitive patterns would be a useful future
direction for efforts to better understand the mindfulness construct.
Other measures of visual attention bias to emotional cues may also be useful in examining com‐
ponents of mindfulness. Examples of such tasks include the emotional Stroop paradigm (Paelecke‐Ha‐
bermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005), the Attention Network Task (Fan et al., 2002; 2005), and the Negative
Affective Priming Task (see De Raedt, et al., 2012). Each of these measures examines cognitive attention
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processes in response to emotionally‐charged stimuli and, therefore, could be used to assess relation‐
ships among components of mindfulness and visual attention biases and further clarify the mindfulness
construct.
Third, there may be alternate ways to measure biased attention that involve neither eye move‐
ment tracking nor response time measures, each of which has limitations (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, &
Mogg, 2007; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995; Leyman,
De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011). Functional neuroimaging research, for example, has yielded
evidence that mindfulness is correlated with activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (Hölzel, et al.,
2007; Gard, et al., 2012) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Allen, et al., 2012). Activation in such
areas is also related to attentional control processes (such as sustained attention, inhibition, and atten‐
tion switching; Cahn & Polich, 2006; Hölzel, et al., 2007; Tang & Posner, 2014; Tang, Tang, & Posner,
2013). Examination of the relationships among components of mindfulness and patterns of frontal neu‐
ral activation in response to emotional stimuli could provide further insight into the construct of mind‐
fulness.
Fourth, it is possible that the construct of the two component model of mindfulness was not
measured appropriately and it may be possible to better examine mindful attention and mindful ac‐
ceptance through other measures of mindfulness. For example, mindful attention can also be measured
by subscales of mindfulness measures (such as observe and/or describe from the Kentucky Inventory of
Mindfulness [KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004] or Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire [FFMQ; Baer,
et al., 2008]) or the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), which have been
developed and validated as measures of mindful attention. Some concerns have also been noted with
these measures in the literature (Cardaciotto, et al., 2008; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010). In ad‐
dition, components of mindful acceptance could also be assessed from specific acceptance subscales
from either the KIMS (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004) or FFMQ, or mindful acceptance can be measured by
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the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau, et al., 2006), which is a psychometrically validated measure
that has been shown to measure mindful acceptance. It is possible that using multiple measures of
these two components of mindfulness in relation to measures assessing attentional processes to emo‐
tional stimuli may help to clarify the construct of mindfulness.
4.4

Conclusions
The present study examined relationships among a proposed two component definition of

mindfulness—attention and acceptance—and attention bias to sad faces in order to clarify the mindful‐
ness construct. Findings from the present study suggest no significant relationships among the variables
of interest, which is inconsistent with previous research showing relationships between mindfulness and
measures of sustained attention and inhibition (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Deng, Li, & Tang, 2014; De
Raedt, et al., 2011; Heeren, Van Broek, & Philippot, 2009; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Moore &
Malinowski, 2009; Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009; Short, Mazmanian, Oinonen, & Mushquash,
2015; Tang et al., 2007; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013; Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Vega, et al., 2014; Wenk‐
Sormaz, 2005; Semple, 2010). It is possible, however, that mindfulness, defined as mindful attention
and mindful acceptance, may relate to patterns of cognitive rather than behavioral biases. Additionally,
given the lack of relationship between reaction time attention bias scores and eye tracking gaze dura‐
tions, it is possible that these measures assess different attention constructs and may not be a true
measure of attention control in the moment.
The inconsistency between present findings and previous research could also be affected by lim‐
itations with the present study. First, the attention bias measures may not be measuring the same at‐
tention constructs as attention measures used in previous studies and the dot‐probe attention bias task
is not as reliable as other measures of attention processes. Second, it is unclear exactly what the sub‐
scales of the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale measure, making it difficult to clarify the construct of mind‐
fulness, particularly in relation to mental health.
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The results from this study do not conclude the examination and exploration of the mindfulness
construct and, specifically, the two component model of mindfulness. Future research is needed to fur‐
ther explore mindfulness, mindfulness components, and relationships among components of mindful‐
ness and measures of attentional processes in response to emotionally‐charged stimuli. Such further re‐
search could lead to greater clarity in the construct of mindfulness.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Behavioral studies correlating depression and attention bias
Behavioral Studies Correlating Depression and Attention Bias
Authors
Gotlib, Kasch, et
al., 2004

N
88
55

Diagnosis
Major Depressive
Disorder (MDD)
Healthy Control
(HC)

Age
34.5
33.6

Stimuli
Sad, angry,
happy, and
neutral faces

Comparison
Group x Face
emotion

Sad, angry,
and happy
faces

MDD com‐
pared to con‐
trols.

Gotlib, Krasnop‐
erova, et al., 2004

19
16

MDD
HC

Joormann &
Gotlib, 2007

26
23
19

MDD
MDD, remitted
HC

35.0
36.1
46.4

Sad, happy,
and neutral
faces

Group x Face
emotion

Kujawa, et al.,
2011

15

Females at risk for
MDD
Female HC
Males at risk for
MDD
Male HC

6.15

Sad, happy,
and neutral
faces

Group x Face
emotion

27
21
36

6.10
6.21
6.19

General Results
No main effects of group
or emotion, but the inter‐
action was significant. Pa‐
tients with MDD, com‐
pared HC, showed bias to‐
ward sad faces more than
any other expressions.
Participants with MDD
showed significant atten‐
tion bias for sad faces than
did HC, and participants
with MDD showed no sig‐
nificant bias for happy
faces.
Both participants with
MDD and with remitted
MDD had significantly
greater attention bias to
sad faces than did HC. HC,
compared to other partici‐
pants, showed greater at‐
tention bias for happy
faces.
Females at risk for MDD,
compared to HC and males
at risk for MDD, showed
an attention bias to sad
faces. Authors suggest
that such attention biases
may be a vulnerability
marker for MDD. No signif‐
icant differences between
groups were found in at‐
tention biases toward
happy faces.
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Behavioral Eye Tracking Studies Correlating Depression and Attention Bias
Authors

N

Diagnosis

Age

Stimuli

Caseras et al.,
2007

23

Dysphoric

22.6

20

Non‐dys‐
phoric

22.1

Negative, positive
and neutral
scenes

Eye‐track‐
ing
Orientation
time & gaze
duration

Comparison

General Results

Group x Scene
emotion

Dysphoric individuals, com‐
pared to nondysphoric in‐
dividuals, gazed longer at
negative scenes. No signif‐
icant group differences on
measures of initial orient‐
ing.
Individuals with MDD
looked first and longer
(gaze duration) toward sad
faces and spent slightly less
time viewing happy faces.
Individuals with MDD
gazed longer at dysphoric
scenes compared to HC.

Duque &
Vázquez, 2015

16
34

MDD
HC

26.3
27.0

Sad, happy, an‐
gry, and neutral
faces

First fixa‐
tion & gaze
duration

Group x Face
emotion

Eizenman et
al., 2003

8
9

MDD
HC

36.9
27

Gaze dura‐
tion

Group x Scene
emotion

Kellough,
Beevers, Ellis,
& Wells, 2008

15
45

MDD
HC

Dysphoric
(sad/loss), threat‐
ening, social, and
neutral scenes.
Dysphoric
(sad/loss), threat‐
ening, social, and
neutral scenes

Orientation
time & gaze
duration

Group x Scene
emotion

Leyman et al.,
2011

19
20

Dysphoric
Non‐dys‐
phoric

Sad, angry,
happy, and neu‐
tral faces

Gaze dura‐
tion

Group x Face
emotion

Matthews &
Antes, 1992

20
20

Dysphoric
Non‐dys‐
phoric

Sad, happy and
neutral scenes

Orientation
time & gaze
duration

Group x Scene
emotion

Individuals with MDD had
longer total gaze durations
at dysphoric stimuli com‐
pared to the never de‐
pressed HC. All partici‐
pants tended to initially
orient toward threat and
positive stimuli over dys‐
phoric stimuli.
Dysphoric individuals had
longer gaze durations at
sad and neutral faces than
nondysphoric individuals;
nondysphoric individuals
had longer gaze durations
for happy faces than dys‐
phoric individuals. Authors
argue that gaze duration is
the most straight forward
measure of sustained at‐
tention.
Dysphoric individuals had
longer gaze durations to
sad scenes compared to
nondysphoric individuals.
Both dysphoric and non‐
dysphoric participants ini‐
tially quickly oriented to‐
ward happy scenes com‐
pared to sad scenes.
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Appendix B. Demographic Survey
Date of Birth: _______/_______/_______
Age: _______
Date of Survey Completion: _______/_______/_______
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Appendix C. The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale

Associations among components of mindfulness and attention bias – 66

Associations among components of mindfulness and attention bias – 67

Associations among components of mindfulness and attention bias – 68

Appendix D. Sample Images from the Dot‐Probe Attention Bias paradigm
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Appendix E. Linear Regression assumptions
Linear regression assumptions were probed for each of the four dependent variables. Transfor‐
mations were implemented in order to meet assumptions as needed and as noted in the document.
The Behavioral Reaction Time Data
First, normality assumptions were probed for both behavioral reaction time dependent varia‐
bles, which showed very little skewness and kurtosis. Specifically, attention bias to sad faces data
showed a skew of .369, with a standard error of skewness of .236, and a kurtosis of .330, with a stand‐
ard error of kurtosis of .467. The attention bias to happy faces data showed almost no skew as the anal‐
ysis suggests a skew of ‐.009 with a standard error of skewness of .236. This data is slightly leptokurtis,
as analysis showed a kurtosis of 1.311 and a standard error of kurtosis of .467; however, this is not out‐
side the acceptable ranges of normality. Therefore, the behavioral reaction time data met normality as‐
sumptions.
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Additionally, the residuals of the variables appear to be normal and linear, as shown on both the
q‐q and p‐p plots.

There is also homoscedasticity for both dependent variables.
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Finally, both independent variables showed no multicollinearity within regression analysis for
attention bias to sad faces (PHLMS Awareness: VIF = 1.001; PHLMS Acceptance: VIF = 1.001) or happy
faces (PHLMS Awareness: VIF = 1.001; PHLMS Acceptance: VIF = 1.001).
The Eye Tracking Gaze Fixation Data
First, normality assumptions were probed for both eye tracking gaze fixation dependent varia‐
bles. Although neither gaze fixation for both sad (kurtosis = .036) or happy faces (kurtosis = ‐.188)
showed problems with kurtosis, both displayed a left skew (gaze fixation for sad faces: skew = ‐.893;
gaze fixation for happy faces: skew = ‐.816). Therefore, the data were transformed using a square trans‐
formation. After transformation, both skewness (gaze fixation for sad faces: skew = ‐.053; gaze fixation
for happy faces: skew = ‐.045) and kurtosis (gaze fixation for sad faces: kurtosis = ‐.843; gaze fixation for
happy faces: skew = ‐.549) suggested normality of the data.
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Additionally, the residuals of the variables (of the transformed data) appear to be normal and
linear, as shown on both the q‐q and p‐p plots.
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There appears to be homoscedasticity for both dependent variables.

Finally, both independent variables showed no multicollinearity within regression analysis for
attention bias to sad faces (PHLMS Awareness: VIF = 1.001; PHLMS Acceptance: VIF = 1.001) or happy
faces (PHLMS Awareness: VIF = 1.002; PHLMS Acceptance: VIF = 1.002).
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Appendix F. Further Analysis of demographic variables.
T‐tests for Ethnicity Differences on the PHLMS Subscales and Dot‐probe Data.

PHLMS Attention
PHLMS Acceptance
Attention Bias to Sad
Faces
Attention Bias to
Happy Faces

Degrees of
Freedom

t

p

102
102
102

‐1.18
2.02
.72

.24
.05
.48

102

‐.50

.62

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Upper
‐4.70
1.20
.07
7.68
‐12.30
26.16
‐21.65

12.95

T‐test for Ethnicity Differences on the PHLMS Subscales and Attention Bias Tasks (Eye Tracking Data).

PHLMS Attention
PHLMS Acceptance
Attention Bias to Sad
Faces
Attention Bias to
Happy Faces

Degrees of
Freedom

t

p

84
84
84

‐.23
2.30
‐1.71

.82
.02
.09

84

‐1.63

.11

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Upper
‐4.04
3.21
.68
9.42
‐1274.94
96.10
‐1226.92

123.30

ANOVA Between Race Group Differences on the PHLMS Attention Subscale (Dot‐probe Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
100
104

Mean Square

F

Significance

85154.90
35.05
26.57

3205.52
1.32

.00
.27

ANOVA Between Race Group Differences on the PHLMS Acceptance Subscale (Dot‐probe Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
100
104

Mean Square

F

Significance

36014.12
130.35
43.41

829.65
3.00

.00
.03

ANOVA Between Race Group Differences in Attention bias to sad faces (Dot‐probe Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
100
104

Mean Square

F

Significance

27.00
1428.38
1124.14

.02
1.27

.88
.30
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ANOVA Between Race Group Differences in Attention bias to Happy Faces (Dot‐probe Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
100
104

Mean Square

F

Significance

8405.53
1612.96
894.24

9.40
1.80

.00
.15

ANOVA Between Race Group Differences on the PHLMS Attention Subscale (Eye Tracking Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
82
86

Mean Square

F

Significance

72291.20
39.79
31.27

2312.06
1.27

.00
.29

ANOVA Between Race Group Differences on the PHLMS Acceptance Subscale (Eye Tracking Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
82
86

Mean Square

F

Significance

31886.72
127.07
45.79

696.31
2.78

.00
.05

ANOVA Between Group Differences in Total Gaze Duration for Sad Faces (Eye Tracking Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
82
86

Mean Square

F

Significance

168462310.52
431608.17
1152421.70

146.18
.38

.00
.77

ANOVA Between Group Differences in Total Gaze Duration for Happy Faces (Eye Tracking Data).

Intercept
Race
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
1
3
82
86

Mean Square

F

Significance

166212833.07
207436.60
1199100.15

138.62
.17

.00
.91
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Appendix G. The Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms Scale
The Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms (IDAS) is a self‐report inventory designed to
assess depressive and anxious symptoms. The IDAS was developed through factor analyses on data
sampled from three populations (Watson, et al., 2007) and consists of 99 items addressing common
feelings, thoughts, and experiences related to both anxiety and depression. The 20 item General De‐
pression scale, therefore, includes statements related more specifically to the experience of depression.
Within a college sample, the General Depression scale of the IDAS has been shown to be internally con‐
sistent (α = .89 with an average internal correlation of .30), highly correlated with the Beck Depression
Inventory‐II (BDI‐II; r = .83, p < .01), and moderately correlated with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; r =
.69, p < .01). Within a broader sample (which included high school students, college students, young
adults, psychiatric patients, postpartum women) the IDAS General Depression Scale continued to be in‐
ternally consistent (α = .88‐.92 with an average internal correlation of .27‐.36), highly reliable (retest
correlations at one week were r = .84), and was correlated with the BDI‐II (r = .83) and the Hamilton Rat‐
ing Scale for Depression (HRSD; r = .67, p < .01). Specifically, within the adolescent sample IDAS General
Depression Scale was correlated with the Reynolds Adolescent Depression Scale (r = .86), and, within the
postpartum women sample, the IDAS General Depression Scale was correlated with the Edinburgh Post‐
natal Depression Scale (r = .83).
For exploratory analysis, the present study was also assessed considering only the data from
those individuals who scored in the fourth quartile of the IDAS General Depression Scale. The output for
the behavioral reaction time data is given below.
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Age
N

Valid
Missing

23
0
19.52
19.00
19
1.755
3.079
1.591
.481

Ethnicity

Race

23
0
.9565
1.0000
1.00
.20851
.043
-4.796
.481

23
0
1.7391
2.0000
2.00
.81002
.656
-.590
.481

Statistics
IDASPHLMS
Dep
Awareness
23
23
0
0
67.30
38.00
63.00
38.00
60a
39a
8.901
3.943
79.221
15.545
1.284
.361
.481
.481

PHLMS
Acceptance
23
0
39.04
39.00
39
6.026
36.316
-.462
.481

Attention bias
to sad
23
0
-5.265
-14.405
-65.344a
38.935
1515.938
.745
.481

Attention bias
to happy
23
0
11.602
17.628
-102.446a
39.561
1565.059
-.861
.481

.537
.935

-.854
.935

.381
.935

2.155
.935

31
48

26
47

-65.344
87.545

-102.446
91.406

Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of
Skewness
Kurtosis
2.121
23.000
.349
.394
Std. Error of
.935
.935
.935
.935
Kurtosis
Minimum
18
.00
.00
60
Maximum
24
1.00
3.00
89
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Age
Age

Correlations
PHLMS
Awareness
-.200
.013
.361
.953

IDAS-Dep

PHLMS
Acceptance
-.458*
.028

Attention bias
to sad
-.272
.209

Attention bias
to happy
.183
.403

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

23
-.200
.361

23
1

23
-.052
.814

23
.276
.202

23
.142
.518

23
.062
.780

PHLMS
Awareness

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

23
.013
.953

23
-.052
.814

23
1

23
.082
.709

23
.415*
.049

23
-.404
.056

PHLMS
Acceptance

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

23
-.458*
.028

23
.276
.202

23
.082
.709

23
1

23
.106
.631

23
-.137
.533

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

23
-.272
.209

23
.142
.518

23
.415*
.049

23
.106
.631

23
1

23
-.506*
.014

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

23
.183
.403

23
.062
.780

23
-.404
.056

23
-.137
.533

23
-.506*
.014

23
1

N
23
23
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

23

23

23

23

IDAS-Dep

Attention
bias
to sad
Attention
bias
to happy

Closer examination of the data revealed one data point as an outlier. When this data was re‐
moved, the correlations were no longer significant; however, there is still some suggestion that mindful
attention may be a slightly related to attention bias to sad faces in this small clinical sample.
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Correlations
PHLMSAwareness
Age
Correlation
1
-.208
.059
Sig. (2-tailed)
.352
.795
N
22
22
22
IDAS-Dep
Correlation
-.208
1
.008
Sig. (2-tailed)
.352
.972
N
22
22
22
PHLMSCorrelation
.059
.008
1
Awareness
Sig. (2-tailed)
.795
.972
N
22
22
22
PHLMSCorrelation
-.460*
.322
-.096
Acceptance Sig. (2-tailed)
.031
.144
.670
N
22
22
22
.180
Attention
Correlation
-.280
.232
bias to sad
.424
Sig. (2-tailed)
.208
.300
22
N
22
22
-.087
Attention
Correlation
.184
-.006
bias to
.700
Sig. (2-tailed)
.414
.979
happy
22
N
22
22
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
Age

IDAS-Dep

PHLMSAcceptance
-.460*
.031
22
.322
.144
22
-.096
.670
22
1
22
-.054
.813
22
.059
.794
22

Attention bias
to sad
-.280
.208
22
.232
.300
22
.180
.424
22
-.054
.813
22
1
22
-.270
.224
22

Attention bias
to happy
.184
.414
22
-.006
.979
22
-.087
.700
22
.059
.794
22
-.270
.224
22
1

Similar analyses were completed for the eye tracking gaze fixation data of individuals who
scored in the fourth quartile of the IDAS General Depression scale. The output for this data is giving be‐
low.

22

Associations among components of mindfulness and attention bias – 80

IDASDep
21
1

PHLMS
Awareness
21
1

Statistics
PHLMS
Acceptance
21
1

Attention bias
to sad
20
2

Attention bias
to happy
20
2

Gaze Fixation
Happy (Squared)
21
1

Gaze Fixation
Sad (Squared)
21
1

Mean
19.29
.9524
1.952
66.81
Median
19.00
1.000
2.000
63.00
Mode
19
1.00
2.00
63
Std. Deviation
1.521
.2182
.740
8.959
Variance
2.314
.048
.548
80.262
Skewness
1.818
-4.583
-.741
1.546
Std. Error of
.501
.501
.501
.501
Skewness
Kurtosis
3.765
21.000
1.405
1.034
Std. Error of Kur.972
.972
.972
.972
tosis
Minimum
18
.00
.00
60
Maximum
24
1.00
3.00
89
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

37.86
38.00
39a
4.028
16.229
.501
.501

39.71
40.00
39
5.866
34.414
-.733
.501

-2.90
-10.87
-65a
40.092
1607.364
.699
.512

13.23
21.25
-102a
41.641
1733.991
-.961
.512

1492.194
1378.488
26.85a
1213.074
1471550.147
.565
.501

1347.356
1476.327
48.43a
1017.406
1035115.876
.371
.501

.646
.972

-.243
.972

.217
.992

2.123
.992

-.689
.972

-.593
.972

31
48

26
47

-65
88

-102
91

26.85
4043.31

48.43
3539.66

Age
N

Valid
Missing

21
1

Ethnicity

Race

21
1

21
1

Associations among components of mindfulness and attention bias – 81

Age
Age

IDASDep
-.139
.548

PHLMS
Awareness
-.107
.644

Correlations
PHLMS
Attention bias
Acceptance
to sad
-.360
-.145
.109
.542

Attention bias
to happy
.275
.240

Gaze Fixation
Happy (Squared)
-.060
.797

Gaze Fixation
Sad (Squared)
-.114
.624

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

21
-.139
.548

21
1

21
.005
.984

21
.311
.170

20
.117
.622

20
.097
.684

21
.347
.123

21
.382
.088

PHLMS
Awareness

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

21
-.107
.644

21
.005
.984

21
1

21
.159
.491

20
.522*
.018

20
-.400
.081

21
-.013
.954

21
-.022
.925

PHLMS
Acceptance

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

21
-.360
.109

21
.311
.170

21
.159
.491

21
1

20
.009
.971

20
-.213
.368

21
-.186
.420

21
-.200
.384

Attention bias
to sad

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

21
-.145
.542

21
.117
.622

21
.522*
.018

21
.009
.971

20
1

20
-.576**
.008

21
-.171
.471

21
-.195
.409

Attention bias
to happy

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

20
.275
.240

20
.097
.684

20
-.400
.081

20
-.213
.368

20
-.576**
.008

20
1

20
.258
.272

20
.175
.459

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

20
-.060
.797

20
.347
.123

20
-.013
.954

20
-.186
.420

20
-.171
.471

20
.258
.272

20
1

20
.930**
.000

N
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

21
-.114
.624

21
.382
.088

21
-.022
.925

21
-.200
.384

20
-.195
.409

20
.175
.459

21
.930**
.000

21
1

21

21

20

20

21

21

IDAS-Dep

Gaze Fixation
Happy
(Squared)
Gaze Fixation
Sad
(Squared)

N
21
21
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

